












The likely regional impacts of an agricultural 




Isabelle Sin, Emma Brunton, Joanna Hendy, Suzi Kerr 
 
Motu Working Paper 05–08 








Author contact details 
Suzi Kerr 
Motu Economic and Public Policy Research 












Motu Economic and Public Policy Research 
jo.hendy@motu.org.nz 
Acknowledgements 
This research is part of Motu’s “Land Use, Climate Change and Kyoto” research 
programme, which is carried out in collaboration with Landcare Research and 
others. This research programme is funded by a grant from the Foundation for 
Research, Science and Technology. We would like to thank Jason Timmins for 
his assistance, and participants at the 2004 New Zealand Association of 
Economists conference and Motu’s “Land Use, Climate Change and Kyoto: 
Human dimensions research to guide New Zealand policy” policy workshop, 
October 2004 for their helpful comments. We would also like to thank 
participants of Motu’s “Land Use, Climate Change and Kyoto: Human 
dimensions research to guide New Zealand policy” research workshops between 
2002 and 2005, for their input into the development of the fundamental project, 
which this report relies on. Any remaining errors or omissions are the 
responsibility of the authors. 
Motu Economic and Public Policy Research 








© 2005 Motu Economic and Public Policy Research Trust. All rights reserved. No portion of this 
paper may be reproduced without permission of the authors. Motu Working Papers are research 
materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and discussion. They have not 
necessarily undergone formal peer review or editorial treatment. ISSN 1176-2667.  
Abstract 
Hendy and Kerr (2005b) find that an emissions charge on agricultural 
methane and nitrous oxide of $25 per tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent 
would be likely to reduce New  Zealand’s net land-use related emissions for 
commitment period one in the order of 3%, with full accounting. The costs per 
farmer and as a percentage of profit would be very high. This paper considers the 
regional impacts of such a policy in New  Zealand by allocating the emission 
charge across space according to the location of animals. We then combine our 
emissions charge information with data on the socio-economic characteristics of 
the affected areas. Obviously rural areas are heavily affected. In many respects, 
for example median income, ethnic mix, and percentage of working people with a 
university degree, the rural areas most affected have very similar socio-economic 
characteristics to other parts of rural New Zealand. Only in two ways do they 
appear to differ. Our findings indicate that areas with high emission costs tend to 
have high employment rates, but that they also have a disproportionately high 
number of unqualified people.  
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 1 
1 Introduction 
In most developed countries, agricultural emissions are a tiny fraction 
of total greenhouse gas emissions. In New Zealand, however, they are much more 
significant, constituting approximately half of the country’s overall emissions 
(Brown and Plume, 2004). It therefore seems likely that New Zealand’s fight to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions will one day come to include agricultural 
emissions. In fact, the regulation of agricultural emissions has already entered the 
thoughts of politicians. The New  Zealand Government recently proposed a 
methane research levy aimed at increasing funding for research into reducing 
ruminant methane emissions. However, this proposal was met by violent 
opposition on the part of farmers, and became infamously known as the ‘fart tax’.
1 
Despite all the public debate over the proposed methane levy, we still know very 
little about what the actual economic and social costs of an agricultural emissions 
charge would be. This information is necessary for making informed policy 
decisions.  
The policy we consider in this preliminary paper is an emissions charge 
of $25 per tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent on agricultural methane and 
nitrous oxide in 2002. In Hendy and Kerr (2005b) we use an integrated model, 
Land Use in Rural New Zealand: Climate (LURNZv1: Climate), to suggest that 
such a charge would have reduced net land-use related emissions for commitment 
period one by 3%, if it had been introduced from 2003. The very small size of this 
effect may be partly because currently a methane charge would be based on 
animal numbers and species only, and a nitrous oxide tax would probably be 
based on these and on fertiliser use only so farmers’ ability to reduce taxed 
emissions is extremely limited. They can only reduce animal numbers and 
fertiliser use. In our current model, the response is further limited because we 
allow only the area of each land use to change, and not stocking rates or rates of 
                                                             
1 In mid-2003 the Government proposed that farm businesses pay an agricultural emissions 
research levy that would raise NZ$8.4 million to fund research into ways of reducing non-CO2 
emissions from agricultural activities. This proposal was replaced in 2004 by a partnership 
agreement on voluntary research into agricultural greenhouse gas emissions signed by the 
Government and agricultural sector groups. 2 
fertiliser application within each land use. Thus our estimate is likely to be low 
relative to what could be achieved with a more sophisticated policy. 
In this paper we consider the regional impacts of a climate change 
policy that targets agricultural emissions. Agricultural emissions may be targeted 
through a tax, a credit system (with credits allocated in a range of ways), or a 
command and control policy. Any emissions charge levied by the Government 
would probably be accompanied by a reduction in other distortionary taxes, such 
as labour taxes, so that the policy would be fiscally neutral overall. It is not clear, 
however, which other taxes the Government would cut. Consequently, we cannot 
determine the distribution of effects of the tax cut. Thus we make the implicit 
assumption that the benefits of the tax cut are spread equally across all people and 
regions in the economy, and focus only on the distributional effects of the 
methane and nitrous oxide charges. The distributional effects of any specific 
choice of tax reduction could be analysed separately and added to the effects we 
find here.  
We assume that every hectare with a specific land use is equally 
affected by the cost of the emissions policy in proportion to regional stocking 
rates, and that the cost is not shifted out of the geographic area in which the land 
lies. For example, we assume that impact on dairy land only differs between the 
Far North and Gore because there are more dairy cows per hectare on a dairy farm 
in the Far North than on a dairy farm in Gore.  We expect that the costs of the 
charge will mostly be borne by the farmers but that the charge would also have a 
significant effect on the local economy, in the same way that recent high dairy 
prices have led to regional economic expansion. Having estimated how the costs 
of the emissions charge will fall across the country, we combine this information 
with data on the socio-economic characteristics of areas by linking the Geographic 
Information System (GIS) datasets of current land use with meshblock level 
census data. This allows us to assess the characteristics of the areas that are likely 
to be most affected by the tax. 3 
2 Tax  incidence 
2.1 Theory 
Through legislation, taxes are levied on particular groups of agents, 
such as employers, employees, or the producers of a specific good. These agents 
face the impact of the tax, or its direct effects, in the absence of any changes to 
price or economic behaviour. However, the ultimate cost of the tax may be 
passed on through prices, and thus may end up distributed quite differently across 
agents. The agents upon whom the tax is levied may in fact bear only a small (or 
even zero) direct cost. The agents that ultimately bear the cost of tax are said to 
bear the tax incidence, or indirect effects.
2 
A tax levied on employers, for instance, may be shifted forward to 
customers through higher output prices, or backward to employees through lower 
wages. In a competitive market, the degree to which a tax is passed on to 
customers depends on the relative elasticities of supply and demand for the 
output. Consider the case of a per unit tax of x dollars on a specific good, levied 
on firms. Before the tax, supply and demand in the industry are given by S0 and 
D in Figure 1. After the tax, the price paid by consumers required for producers 
to be willing to produce each quantity increases by x. Graphically, this is 
represented by an upwards shift of the supply curve of x dollars to S1. However, 
the final price paid by consumers rises by less than x because quantity adjusts 
downwards.  
                                                             
2 This section on tax incidence draws heavily on Stiglitz (1988). 4 
 
Figure 1: A tax shared between producers and consumers 
 
In this illustrated case, part of the incidence falls upon producers, who 
receive a lower price, and part upon consumers, who pay a higher price. 
However, it may be that most or all of the incidence falls on just one type of 
party. If demand is perfectly elastic (the demand curve is horizontal), or supply is 
perfectly inelastic (the supply curve is vertical), it is easy to see that the price paid 
by consumers does not change at all, thus producers bear the entire incidence. 
Conversely, if demand is perfectly inelastic (vertical) or supply is perfectly elastic 
(horizontal), then the price paid by consumers rises by x, quantity does not 
change, and consumers bear the entire incidence. These cases suggest a general 
result for competitive markets: the more elastic is demand or inelastic is supply, 
the greater is the proportion of the incidence borne by suppliers, and vice versa. 
A tax of this type could also cause demand for labour by the producing 
firms to fall, and thus the wage to decline. If this occurs, the tax incidence is 
partially or fully shifted backwards to employees. Similarly to the case detailed 













received by firms5 
above, the extent to which the tax incidence is shifted backwards depends on the 
elasticities of supply and demand for labour. The more elastic is labour demand 
in the affected industry or inelastic is labour supply, the greater is the proportion 
of the tax borne by workers, the suppliers of labour. 
When an additional tax is levied in an economy, however, the effects 
tend to spread beyond those directly associated with the party on whom the tax is 
levied. This occurs because those who bear the tax incidence may alter their other 
economic behaviour because of the effects of the tax. A workers who have wages 
reduced may cut back on consumption expenditure, as may a shareholder in a 
firm that bears some of the tax incidence. The firm itself may reduce investment. 
The economic agents affected by these secondary effects may also alter their 
behaviour, and so on. 
In this paper, we consider a tax levied at the level of the farmer. 
New  Zealand sheep/beef farmers sell their products in a large international 
market. Furthermore, the outputs from sheep/beef farms are commodities, and so 
are undifferentiated from sheep/beef products produced in other countries. 
Consequently, New Zealand sheep/beef farmers are price takers and are unable to 
pass any tax burden on to their customers. Thus the only way they are able to shift 
the tax burden is backwards to their workers.  
Dairy farmers, on the other hand, may have a small influence on 
international dairy prices. Although international demand for New Zealand’s dairy 
exports is still very elastic, dairy exports face one of the least elastic international 
demands of any of New Zealand’s exports.
3  That is, international demand for 
New Zealand’s exports of dairy products falls more slowly as dairy output price 
rises than do the demands for most of New Zealand’s other exports when their 
prices rise.  
The supply of New  Zealand farm outputs may be reasonably elastic 
because if returns to farm labour decrease, farmers may choose to work less on 
their farms, reduce farm output, and increase their off-farm work. There is 
                                                             
3 Personal communication with Ralph Lattimore, agricultural economics consultant, 9 June 2005. 
Also see Finlayson et al (1988). 6 
evidence to suggest that many farmers do some form of additional non-farm work, 
so they may not have great difficulty increasing the quantity of this.
4  They may 
also choose to change their land use. However, in this paper we do not consider 
how supply is likely to change in response to an agricultural emissions charge. We 
assume perfectly inelastic supply. 
In addition to potentially being able to pass a small proportion of the 
cost of an emissions charge forwards to international consumers, dairy farmers 
may pass some of the burden to farm workers. The degree to which both dairy and 
sheep/beef farmers would pass the burden of an agricultural emissions charge on 
to their workers depends on two major factors. The first is the degree to which 
they are able to reduce their labour requirements through measures such as 
substituting unpaid family labour for hired employees, reducing work on farm 
maintenance, or reducing farm production. If farmers are more able to reduce their 
demand for labour, they will pass more of the effects of the tax on to farm 
workers. The second factor is the degree to which farm workers are willing and 
able to find work in alternative industries. If farm workers have a lot of options 
for work outside the agricultural industry, farm owners will have difficulty 
retaining labour if they attempt to reduce the wages of their employees. In this 
case, farmers will bear more of the tax incidence.  
The effects of a methane tax would spread beyond farmers and farm 
employees. These people, when faced with lower incomes, would most likely 
curtail their spending in a range of areas, thus adversely affecting businesses that 
relied on their custom.  
We expect that most of the cost would stay with farmers, and perhaps 
some be passed on to farm employees, who tend to be located where the farms 
are. Though these people may affect their local communities, by curtailing their 
spending and thus adversely affecting businesses that relied on their custom, we 
expect the short run spread of the cost of the emissions charge to mostly be 
limited to the geographic areas containing farms. Hall and McDermott (2004, 
Abstract) find “considerable evidence of certain regional cycles being associated 
                                                             
4 See, for example, Parminter (1997).  7 
with movements in New  Zealand’s aggregate terms of trade, real prices of 
milksolids, real dairy land prices and total rural land prices”. 
In the long run, migration and capital movements will tend to smooth 
out regional differences. The wider macroeconomic impacts of changes in 
agricultural returns will be felt all over the country.  
2.2 Previous  literature on the incidence of 
environmental taxes 
A range of literature explores the incidence of environmental taxes. The 
simplest consideration that relates to an environmental tax is the question of who 
legally pays the tax bill.    
At the next level of complexity, we can consider who pays the cost of 
the tax in a partial equilibrium setting. In the context of this paper, this means that 
we allow for farmers to pass the cost of the tax on to consumers or back to 
workers, but we assume that farmers do not change the use of their land in 
response to the tax, nor do other prices or behaviours in the economy change. The 
majority of environmental policy incidence studies fall into this level of 
complexity. For instance, Poterba (1990 and 1991) investigates the extent to 
which gasoline tax is regressive by calculating expenditure on gasoline as a 
proportion of total expenditure for households with different levels of overall 
expenditure. It allows the cost of the gasoline tax to be passed on to consumers, 
but does not consider the extent to which different households are likely to have 
changed their gasoline purchasing habits in response to the tax. Kerr (2001), a 
New Zealand paper, uses the same approach to analyse the distributional effects of 
a tax on petrol in New Zealand. At a slightly higher level of complexity, Creedy 
and Sleeman (2004), a New Zealand study, uses input–output analysis to explore 
the impacts of carbon taxes on consumer prices.  
The highest level of complexity is general equilibrium. For 
investigating a methane tax, this would mean allowing for adjustments such as 
converting some sheep/beef farms (which emit methane) to forestry (which does 
not), as well as adjustments that would occur throughout other sectors of the 
economy. The information requirements for general equilibrium analysis are 8 
much higher than for partial equilibrium. For instance, to estimate the degree of 
real adjustment caused by price changes we need to estimate price elasticities, 
which can be very challenging to do well. Papers such as Jorgenson et al (1992), 
Bovenberg et al (forthcoming), and Bento et al (forthcoming) use general 
equilibrium frameworks. The former analyses the distributional effect of a carbon 
tax set at the level required to stabilise US carbon dioxide emissions at their 1990 
levels. Jorgenson chooses this framework because it allows for both energy prices 
and other prices to change, whereas a partial equilibrium analysis would only 
permit energy prices to change.  
In the case of a New Zealand methane and nitrous oxide tax, most of 
the incidence of the tax is likely to fall on producers rather than consumers. Thus 
we are interested in the location of rural landowners, farmers and farm workers, as 
well as the local economies that are driven by agricultural profitability. 
3 Data 
This section outlines the data we use in our analysis. Appendix A gives 
more detailed information on the data. 
3.1  Emissions charge impact data
5 
Our emissions charge impact data is derived from Hendy and Kerr 
(2005b). They calculate the impact of an emissions charge of $25 per tonne of 
CO2 equivalent in terms of changes in the price of the farm output.
6 Methane 
emissions are converted to CO2 Global Warming Potential (GWP) equivalents 
using the formula CO2(kg) = 1/21 x CH4(kg); nitrous oxide emissions are 
converted by CO2(kg) = 1/310 x N2O(kg). This $25 amount is the same as the 
maximum charge the Government plans to put on fossil fuel emissions from 
                                                             
5 The derived methane costs presented in this paper are preliminary and subject to inaccuracy. 
They are most useful to interpret differences in cost impacts between areas. Absolute costs should 
not be taken seriously, and should not be cited. 
6 Note that a $25 agricultural emissions charge is much higher than the methane research levy the 
Government proposed in 2003. 9 
2007.
7 These impacts are calculated for the two main rural land uses that produce 
methane and nitrous oxide emissions: sheep/beef farming (63% of total enteric 
methane emissions and 70.3% of agricultural direct nitrous oxide emissions), and 
dairy farming (35% of total enteric methane emissions and 27.3% of direct nitrous 
oxide emissions).  
Dairy cattle produce different emissions to sheep and beef cattle and 
have outputs of different values. The manner in which Hendy and Kerr (2005b) 
translate the $25 emissions charge into a cost per kg of output, when combined 
with data on revenue per kg of output, makes the two impact values comparable.  
Emissions per animal are based on the total national emissions for 2002 
in Clark et al (2003) and the Statistics New  Zealand Agricultural Production 
Census 2002. The two sections below detail the revenue implications of a charge 
on dairy and sheep/beef emissions as calculated in Hendy and Kerr (2005b).  
3.1.1 Dairy 
  The cost of a tax of $25 per tonne of CO2 equivalent emitted is $0.30 
per kg of milksolids. Revenue per kg of milksolids in 2002 was $5.31, so this tax 
equates to a 7% reduction in revenue. 
3.1.2 Sheep/beef 
To calculate the impact of an emissions charge on sheep/beef land use,  
Hendy and Kerr (2005b) derive an emissions function based on actual national 
emissions 2002, with its unit defined in terms of a composite sheep/beef product. 
The components of this composite product are beef, lamb, mutton, and wool. The 
cost of a charge of $25 per tonne of CO2 equivalent emitted is $0.42 per kg of 
composite product. Revenue per kg of composite product in 2002 was $3.94, so 
this tax equates to an 11% reduction in revenue. 
                                                             
7 The Government will introduce an emissions charge of $15 per tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent on fossil fuels and industrial process emissions (i.e. carbon dioxide and fossil methane)  
from 2007 (New Zealand. Ministry for the Environment, 2005). The charge of $25 that we use 
approximates the international emissions price.  10 
3.1.3 Spatial  allocation 
  We use the model LURNZv1 from Hendy and Kerr (2005a) to allocate 
land uses spatially across the country. LURNZ assigns a single land use to each 
25 hectare area, using information from the Ministry for the Environment’s 
Landcover Database 2 (LCDB2) based on a composite of satellite maps, regional 
agricultural production statistics from Statistics New  Zealand Agricultural 
Production Surveys and Meat and Wool New Zealand: Economic Service Farm 
Surveys, and physical productivity mappings from Landcare Research. For this 
paper, we aggregate the LURNZv1 results to labour market area (LMA) level, i.e. 
an area defined so that most people live and work within the same area.
8 
Emissions costs are then allocated to LMAs in direct proportion to the areas in 
sheep/beef farming and dairy farming. Thus we create costs for each LMA that 
vary depending on the land uses and land use intensity modelled by LURNZ.  
Because most people live and work in the same LMA, they operate as 
self-contained labour markets in the short run so that wage and employment 
effects from emissions charges borne in these areas will be felt within these areas. 
Other effects, such as through purchase of inputs and retail shopping, may also 
tend to occur within the same LMA. Thus LMAs seem the natural geographic 
units in which the costs of a methane tax are likely to be confined in the short run. 
3.2 Socio-economic  data 
Details of the data used are given in Appendix A. One question that is 
of particular interest to us is whether emissions charges would primarily affect 
people who are in a poor position to cope with the costs. The socio-economic 
characteristics of the people in the most affected areas give us some indication of 
this. Equity issues arise if the emissions charge disproportionately targets one 
group. There is also potential for a political backlash, particularly if the charge 
targets a specific ethnic group.  
                                                             
8 There are 58 LMAs in New Zealand as defined in Newell and Papps (2001). The LMAs are 
defined so that most people who live in an LMA also work in it, and most people who work in an 
LMA also live in it.  11 
We use the 2001 Statistics New Zealand meshblock census database, 
and compile the following variables: 
•  Median incomes (of those aged 15 and over) 
•  Employment rates (as percentages of the population 15 years and over) 
•  Ethnicity—New Zealand European, Māori, Pacific Islander, Asian 
(percentages of the total usually resident population who specify these 
ethnicities as either their ethnicity, or as one of their ethnicities) 
•  Occupation (percentages of the employed population 15 years and over 
with each of these occupations: administration, professional, clerical, 
sales and services, agricultural, and manual) 
•  Qualifications (percentages of the population aged 15 and over with 
each of these highest qualification levels: no qualifications, school 
qualifications, vocational qualifications, and degrees) 
Employment rates tell us about the level of activity in the economy and 
the strength of its labour market. Qualifications give another perspective on the 
ability of people to adjust to shocks. Those with higher qualifications tend to have 
more employment options, and are more able to move to other areas of the 
country for work.  
4  The differential regional impact of an 
agricultural emissions policy 
    The effects of an emissions charge would touch many people and 
businesses. We classify the effects of an emissions charge into direct effects and 
indirect effects. Direct effects are those on the people who actually have to pay the 
charge. Indirect effects are all the other effects that occur as the effects of the 
charge feed through the economy. 
4.1 Direct  effects 
At $25 per tonne of CO2 equivalent, the total annual revenue from the 
charge would have been around $207m from dairy farms and $363m from sheep 
and beef farms in 2002, assuming no behavioural response. This corresponds to 
$109 per ha per year in dairy and $42 per ha per year on sheep/beef land, and will 
probably have corresponding effects on the value of that land. For the average 12 
dairy farm this corresponds to a loss of $15,000 in profit out of average farm net 
trading profits of $48,739 in 2002/03 and $85,029 in 2003/04 (New Zealand. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2004a). For the average sheep/beef farm it 
corresponds to a loss of $13,000 out of average farm net trading profits of 
$86,620in 2002/03 and $40,492 in 2003/04 (New Zealand. Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 2004b). 
The people directly affected by an emissions charge are dairy farmers 
and sheep/beef farmers, who actually pay the emissions charge. We can get a fair 
idea of where these farmers tend to live from the proportions of rural land in the 
LMAs, specifically the share of sheep/beef land or dairy land. Consequently, 
direct effects will be concentrated in areas with high proportions of sheep/beef or 
dairy land.  
The parties directly affected by an emissions charge, the owners of 
dairy and sheep/beef farms, face charges in proportion to their number of stock. 
Geographically, the distribution of these people is close to the distribution of dairy 
and sheep/beef farms, which we show in Figure 2. When the owners are not living 
on the farms, the impact of charges on profit and land values may occur in other 
regions but the employment impacts will still be co-located with the farms. The 
distributions of farmland shown here are derived using the model LURNZv1. 
With detailed information on the socio-economic characteristics of farm 
owners, including information on the level of debt farmers bear, we would be able 
to determine the ability to cope of the people directly affected by the emissions 
charge. In the absence of this information, we focus for the remainder of this 
paper on the characteristics of those indirectly affected.   13 
Figure 2: The distribution of land use 
 14 
 
4.2 Indirect  effects 
Indirect effects spread out through the economy from those directly 
affected. For example, when an emissions charge is introduced dairy farmers will 
find themselves facing increased costs. They will reduce their spending. Some of 
these farmers may lay off farm workers or reduce the wages they offer. These 
adversely affected farm workers may reduce their own expenditure, negatively 
affecting businesses in their communities. In this manner, the effects of a methane 
charge would flow on through the community.  
We expect indirect effects to be strongest for people geographically 
close to those directly affected, and thus we make the assumption that indirect 
effects strike the LMAs in which the direct effects occur. It is important to 
examine these impacts spatially because the size of the impact depends on the 
nature of the local economy. For instance, the impact of laying off 50 people in an  
isolated area will be much greater than laying off 50 people in a dynamic urban 
area with a strong labour market.  
One way that we can gauge the magnitude of the indirect effect in 
various LMAs is by measuring the per capita cost of an emissions charge by 
LMA. Alternatives include calculating the proportion of the population of the 
LMA employed directly by the dairy or sheep/beef industries, and calculating the 
proportion employed either directly or indirectly by the dairy or sheep/beef 
industries. Another way of estimating where impacts will be most severe is by 
looking at the proportion of the total economy that consists of agricultural 
farming. Where agricultural farming is a large proportion of the overall value of 
the economy, impacts are likely to be severe. We calculate these alternative 
measures, and find a high correlation between them and our chosen measure, the 
per capita annual emissions charge. This measure controls for the population of 
the area and tells us about how the charge is spread between LMAs.  
Figure 3 illustrates the locations of the areas that are most affected by 
the emissions charge. The black lines are LMA boundaries. The higher is the cost 
per capita of the charge, the darker is the LMA. The white areas on the map are 15 
Department of Conservation land. The hardest hit areas in the South Island are 
Gore and MacKenzie, which are sheep/beef farming areas. In the North Island the 
hardest hit areas are Taihape, Waipukurau, Te Kuiti and Dannevirke, which are 
mostly sheep/beef farming areas, some with regions of dairy farming. All the 
areas that are hardest hit by the per capita annual emissions charge have fairly low 
populations. Each of these districts is predominantly rural and the towns within 
them are rural centres. 16 
 
Figure 3: The distribution of a per capita emissions charge over LMAs  
 17 
Figure 4 illustrates graphically the spread of per capita costs over 
LMAs. It is immediately evident that the effects of the emissions charge are 
spread very unequally across LMAs. A large number of LMAs are hardly affected 
at all, while a few are very highly affected. The least affected LMAs tend to have 
large urban populations, and include New  Zealand’s major cities. Appendix B 
includes a table of LMAs ranked as in Figure 4. 

























































5 Socio-economic  characteristics  of 
affected LMAs 
In this section of the paper we examine the relationship between the 
socio-economic characteristics of LMAs and their emissions charge costs, based 
on current land use. We use the measure “per capita annual emissions charge” 
throughout this discussion. 
5.1 Employment  rates 
Figure 5 shows the emissions charge effect on LMAs by employment 
rate. Some relationship between the two variables is evident, with areas with high 18 
emissions charge effects also tending to have fairly high employment rates. One 
result of the emissions charge is likely to be job losses in the hard-hit areas. From 
the graph it seems that the areas most likely to face job losses have fairly strong 
labour markets. They may be well placed to absorb the displaced workers back 
into the workforce. This ignores the uneven distribution of people who are not in 
the labour force across LMAs. For instance, an LMA with a very large proportion 
of retired people will have a deceptively low employment rate in this figure. 
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5.2 Median  income 
An emissions charge would affect the incomes of many people, 
especially in the harder-hit areas. Median income levels in these areas give one 
indication of how well those affected would be able to cope with decreases in 
their incomes. However, we cannot say from this data where in the income 
distributions of these areas are the people who are most affected.  19 
Figure 6 suggests that areas with the highest emissions charge effects 
have a variety of median incomes. They are not noticeably different from other 
areas. 














































5.3 Ethnicity  and  occupation 
Our findings for ethnicity and occupation are consistent with 
expectations. For occupation, we find that more agricultural and fishery workers 
live in areas with higher emissions charge effects, and fewer technicians, trades 
workers, workers in administration, professional and clerical occupations live in 
these areas. Other workers are evenly distributed across affected areas. For 
ethnicity, we do not find any clear relationships between emissions charge effects 
and the proportions of Europeans or Māori in the area. However, we find that 
Pacific Islanders and Asians tend not to live in areas with high emissions charges. 
This may simply be caused by the fact that both Pacific Islanders and Asians tend 
not to live in rural areas. 
Neither the ethnicity nor the occupation results suggest that an 
emissions charge would inequitably target any particular socio-economic group. 20 
However, agricultural workers would unavoidably be affected to a greater extent 
than most other professions. 
5.4  Education and formal qualifications 
Figure 7 shows the emissions charge effect on LMAs by the proportion 
of people with no formal qualifications. We can see that most of the observations 
are grouped in the bottom right, with a just a few areas with high qualification 
levels and low emissions charge costs, or with low qualification levels and high 
emissions charge costs. The interesting result here is that the areas with high 
emissions charge effects tend to also have high proportions of people with no 
qualifications. Other levels of qualification did not show a clear pattern. 
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The level of formal education that a person has is an imperfect indicator 
of his or her employability in a wide range of jobs. People with some formal 
qualifications may be more likely to be able to find alternative work if they are 
laid off than are people with no qualifications. 21 
Many of the occupations that revolve around dairy and sheep/beef 
farms, however, tend to involve ‘learning by doing’ rather than formal 
qualifications. Thus many people working in these regions who lack formal 
qualifications may in fact be highly skilled, though the skills may not all be 
transferrable outside the agricultural sector. Consequently, the data on numbers of 
people with no formal qualifications are likely to be a little misleading as an 
indicator of employability. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the possible social impacts of an 
agricultural emissions charge levied on methane and nitrous oxide of $25 per 
tonne of CO2 equivalent. For dairy farmers, this equates to a 7% decrease in 
revenue in the absence of price changes; for sheep/beef farmers, it equates to an  
11% decrease. We assume the effects of the charge stay in the labour market areas 
in which the affected farms are located, and disregard the benefits of the likely 
accompanying tax decrease on the implicit assumption that they are evenly 
distributed across the country. Calculated on a labour market area basis, annual 
emissions charges per capita range from $5 in the Hutt Valley to $2,715 in 
Taihape. 
We examine the socio-economic characteristics of the labour market 
areas with very high per capita emissions charges. These labour market areas 
mostly have high employment rates, which suggests people who lose their jobs 
because of the emissions charge are likely to have decent prospects for finding 
alternative work. On the other hand, labour market areas that would face high per 
capita emissions charges tend to have high proportions of people with no 
qualifications. This may mean that people who are made redundant would tend to 
have low levels of formal qualifications, and thus may have difficulty finding jobs 
in alternative industries. On the whole the socio-economic characteristics of high 
emissions rural areas are very similar to those in rural New Zealand as a whole. 22 
Appendix A: Data 
Methane and nitrous oxide emissions data 
Table 1 Dairy emissions 
 
Table 2 Sheep/beef emissions 
Area of pasture 
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958 (kgs CO2 equivalent 
per hectare) 
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Social characteristics data 
All these data were drawn from Statistics New  Zealand’s 2001 
meshblock census data at meshblock level and were aggregated to LMA level. 
Median income data are the median income of all people aged 15 years 
or over who live in the LMA in 2001. Employment rates were calculated as the 
proportion of the population aged 15 years or over in the LMA who were 
gainfully employed in 2001. These were calculated from the number of people 
Area of pasture 
(2002) 























aged 15 or over who were gainfully employed, and the total number of people 
aged 15 years or over.  
Ethnicity data for 2001 are series giving the percentage of the 
population claiming each of Māori, European, Pacific Island and Asian ethnicity 
as either their only ethnicity or one of their ethnicities. These were calculated 
from the number of people in each LMA claiming each ethnicity, and the total 
population of the LMA.  
Occupation data for 2001 are the percentage of the employed 
population aged 15 years and over in each of a number of occupations. This is the 
percentage of the gainfully employed population aged 15 and over in an LMA that 
are in a particular occupation. The occupations used are: 
•  agriculture and fishery workers 
•  legislators, administrators, and managers 
•  professionals 
•  technicians and associate professionals 
•  clerks 
•  service and sales workers 
•  trades workers 
•  plant and machine operators and assemblers. 
We also use ‘employment by industry’ data drawn from the 2001 
census at the meshblock level. 
Qualification data are the proportion of the population aged 15 years or 
over in the LMA whose highest qualification fell into one of the categories: ‘no 
qualifications’, ‘school qualifications’, ‘vocational qualifications’, and ‘degree’. 
These categories exclude those with post-school qualifications such as university 
diplomas. Except for ‘no qualifications’, each qualification category is an 
aggregation of a number of finer categories. 
•  “School qualifications” contains School Certificate, sixth form 
qualifications, higher school qualifications, unspecified school 
qualifications, and overseas school qualifications. 24 
•  “Vocational qualifications” contains basic vocational, skilled 
vocational, intermediate vocational, and advanced vocational 
qualifications. 
•  “Degree” contains bachelor degree and higher degree. 25 
Appendix B: Impacts by labour market area (LMA) 
per capita 
annual cost 
of charge ($) 
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2,715 Taihape  $19,213 70 62 31 1 1 28 35 17 5
2,636 Gore  $19,496 70 88 9 0 1 32 33 17 5
1,970 MacKenzie  $16,946 69 87 5 0 3 23 34 21 6
1,929 Waipukurau  $18,951 67 76 21 1 1 31 33 18 5
1,872 Te  Kuiti  $17,561 64 58 37 1 1 36 29 16 4
1,776 Dannevirke  $19,041 66 77 19 1 1 34 31 17 4
1,693 Otorohanga  $18,334 63 66 27 1 1 33 30 15 4
1,692 Eketahuna  $17,708 63 80 16 1 1 35 30 17 4
1,442 Balclutha  $18,912 67 88 8 0 1 35 31 16 4
1,296 Taumaranui  $15,456 57 57 37 1 1 34 27 16 4
1,285 Ngaruawahia  $22,159 65 83 11 1 2 32 34 16 4
1,162 Alexandra  $16,687 64 90 6 0 1 26 33 20 7
1,095 Ashburton  $18,834 66 93 5 0 1 32 34 17 4
963 Dargaville  $16,467 57 69 24 1 1 34 30 15 3
907 Stratford  $18,430 62 85 11 0 1 35 29 16 4
874 Kaikoura  $15,734 62 80 14 0 1 30 32 15 5
787 Masterton  $17,448 60 81 14 2 1 29 31 19 6
776 Hawera  $20,970 64 77 18 0 1 34 30 16 4
700 Gisborne  $16,050 56 49 44 1 1 30 30 17 5
653 Morrinsville  $19,931 63 80 13 1 3 31 33 17 5
651 Matamata  $19,671 62 81 15 0 1 32 33 16 5
650 Oamaru  $15,502 57 92 4 1 1 33 32 16 4
563 Warkworth  $16,986 57 80 12 1 1 27 34 18 526 
545 Te  Awamutu  $19,657 62 76 19 1 1 29 32 19 5
503 Waimate  $16,121 58 91 5 1 1 32 32 18 5
442 Kaikohe  $12,545 42 28 58 2 0 32 24 13 3
415 Invercargill  $18,014 62 84 12 1 1 33 30 17 5
412 Napier  $17,213 59 71 22 1 2 29 32 18 6
407 Tokoroa  $17,598 56 55 30 9 1 34 29 16 4
401 Taupo  $18,572 60 65 27 2 1 26 33 19 5
395 Bulls  $16,716 57 76 19 1 1 30 32 17 5
385 Kaitaia  $13,681 46 47 40 1 1 31 26 14 3
382 Thames  $16,209 54 79 14 1 1 30 31 17 5
373 Blenheim  $17,605 64 87 9 1 1 27 34 20 6
358 Te  Puke  $17,807 58 67 24 1 2 30 31 17 4
357 Wanganui  $15,542 53 72 21 1 1 30 30 18 5
332 New  Plymouth  $17,217 57 81 13 1 2 29 30 20 6
326 Greymouth  $16,281 62 86 8 0 1 32 29 17 5
296 Waihi  $14,409 51 76 18 1 1 34 31 16 4
249 Rotorua  $18,724 59 54 35 2 2 26 31 18 7
238 Whangarei  $16,724 54 68 23 1 2 27 31 19 6
237 Whakatane  $15,554 53 50 43 1 1 31 29 18 5
232 Palmerston  Nth  $17,934 59 77 13 2 4 24 35 18 11
232 Kerikeri  $16,013 54 60 28 1 1 24 32 18 6
213 Queenstown  $24,714 76 83 6 1 5 14 39 23 11
207 Hamilton  $18,991 61 70 19 2 5 24 35 19 11
161 Levin  $15,002 51 72 20 3 2 34 29 16 5
141 Nelson  $16,832 61 87 7 1 1 26 33 21 7
134 Christchurch  $18,257 61 84 7 2 4 23 36 18 10
133 Dunedin  $16,119 56 86 6 2 4 22 36 17 13
124 Hastings  $16,446 58 65 24 4 2 28 31 17 6
108 Motueka  $14,870 62 82 10 0 1 27 31 17 527 
41 Tauranga  $17,310 55 78 15 1 2 25 34 20 6
36 SthAuckland  $19,938 58 47 15 19 12 24 36 15 8
9 Picton  $15,067 57 80 13 1 1 29 30 18 5
8 Auckland  $22,641 61 66 8 7 13 16 38 17 15
6 Wellington  $24,941 64 71 10 7 7 15 35 18 21
5 Hutt  Valley  $21,752 62 69 15 7 6 24 35 19 10
 
Notes:  
Median income is calculated for those aged fifteen and over;  
Employment rate is calculated as the percentage of the population 15 years and over;  
The four ethnicity variables are calculated as percentages of the total usually resident population; individuals can belong to more than one ethnic group;  
The four highest qualification variables are calculated as percentages of the population aged 15 years and over. 
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